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Abstract
The Yemen cholera outbreak has been driven by years of conflict and has now become the largest in epidemiologically
recorded history with more than 1.2 million cases since the beginning of the outbreak in April, 2017. In this report we
review and discuss the cholera management strategies applied by the major international humanitarian health
organizations present in Yemen. We find the response by the organizations examined to have been more
focused on case management than on outbreak prevention. Oral Cholera Vaccines (OCVs) were not delivered
until nearly 16 months into the outbreak. A recent scale-up of the global OCV stockpile will hopefully allow
for rapid mass deployment of the OCV in future humanitarian emergencies. Continuous funding to this
stockpile will be crucial to maintain this option for prevention and control of cholera outbreaks. Of equal
importance will be the timely recognition of the need for mass OCV deployment and development of more
specific, comprehensive and actionable evidence-based frameworks to help guide this decision, however
difficult this may be. The outbreak highlights the importance for international humanitarian health organizations
to have a continuous discussion about whether and to what extent they should increase their focus on pre-
emptively addressing the environmental determinants of communicable diseases in humanitarian emergencies.
Strong advocacy from the public health community for peace and the protection of human health, by bringing
to attention the public health impacts of armed conflict and keeping the world’s political leaders accountable to
their actions, will remain crucial.
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Background
The United Nations have deemed the situation in Yemen
the world’s worst humanitarian crisis [1]. In the midst of
this, the largest and fastest spreading cholera outbreak re-
corded since the WHO began recording cholera outbreaks
in 1949 has erupted [2, 3]. As of October 7, 2018, the
WHO estimates a cumulative total of 1,236,028 reported
cases of cholera to have occurred in Yemen since the be-
ginning of the outbreak in April, 2017 [4]. 2556 of these
cases have been fatal, yielding a case fatality rate of 0.21%
[4]. Children constitute 58% of reported cases [5].
How could an outbreak of this scale occur? Already
before the conflict erupted, approximately half of all
children under 5 were stunted reflecting a high preva-
lence of chronic malnutrition, lowering their resilience
towards cholera [6, 7]. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
(WaSH) infrastructure was limited [8]. Destruction of
the fragile WaSH bulwark against water-borne disease
started when bombings commenced in March, 2015 [9].
Over the past 3 years, key infrastructure in Yemen has
been destroyed, hampering the possibility of prevention
and control of cholera in the country. The main seaport
to Yemen, Al-Hudeydah, has been bombed and later
blocked, disrupting the supply of aid and other supplies
into the country [10, 11]. The bridge that used to serve
as the main supply route to the capital, Sana’a, has been
bombed and so have hospitals and other medical facil-
ities [3, 9, 12–14]. The United Nations Office for the Co-
ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) have
estimated that “16 million [people] lack access to safe
water and sanitation, and 16.4 million lack access to ad-
equate healthcare” [15]. The costs of food, water, fuel,
medicines and other basic commodities have increased
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dramatically [16–18], lowering overall resilience towards
cholera in Yemen even further.
It is clear that such a collapse of infrastructure has cre-
ated fertile ground for a cholera outbreak, and that the
critical triggering cause was conflict [9, 15, 17, 19–22].
Both this cause of the problem and its ultimate solution
lie in the political realm, and we strongly advocate for im-
mediate political resolution with involvement from a so
far neglectful international community [23–25]. However,
cholera outbreaks frequently occur on the backdrop of
conflict and/or poor WaSH infrastructure yet fail to
spread so rapidly or to reach this magnitude [26–30]. In
this debate piece we wish to examine if there are any les-
sons for the humanitarian and public health community
that can be taken away from the humanitarian response in
Yemen to better equip us to do our part in preventing fu-
ture outbreaks from reaching this scale.
We reviewed publicly available information on the offi-
cial websites and in reports from the major international
health organizations involved in the humanitarian re-
sponse in Yemen in December 2017, and academic Eng-
lish language literature on the Medline, Embase and
Global Health databases published from 2015 and onward
until submission in May 2018 (search string: “Yemen
AND cholera”), to inform a discussion of potential short-
comings and lessons to be learned from the humanitarian
response by health organizations. Our academic literature
search yielded 40 results, the relevant of which are in-
cluded in this paper. Our review findings are summarized
in Table 1.
Main text
International humanitarian health organization responses
and funding shortfalls
The Yemen Health Cluster consists of 40 member organi-
zations and is coordinated by the WHO [31]. In June,
2017, the WHO and the Health and Water Sanitation and
Hygiene (WaSH) Clusters in Yemen published a response
plan for the cholera outbreak [32]. The plan included two
principal approaches to cholera management: a) treating
all cases of Acute Watery Diarrhea (AWD) as cholera
without the need for lab confirmation in areas where chol-
era has been previously culture confirmed, and b) early re-
sponse epidemiological and case management activities
when a suspected case is reported in an outbreak-free
area. These actors also reported planning to explore the
feasibility of an Oral Cholera Vaccination (OCV) cam-
paign [32].
As part of their general response in Yemen, the WHO
described having sustained functionality of 414 health fa-
cilities, operation of 406 general health and nutrition mo-
bile teams and delivery of child and nutrition interventions
in 323 districts, having established 36 cholera treatment
centers, expanded disease surveillance capacity and having
distributed more than 2 million liters of fuel for hospital
generators, ambulances etc. [33]. Specifically, the WHO
reported having established 139 oral rehydration corners,
trained 900 health workers in the management of cholera,
delivered 1 million bags of IV fluids, distributed 158 chol-
era kits and sent 1450 cholera cots [34], and they had
shipped in ambulances as well [22]. Through these and
other interventions the WHO described having treated
700,000 suspected cases of cholera [34].
UNICEF described having provided safe water to over
one million people and delivered 40 tons of medical
equipment including medicine, Oral Rehydration Solution
(ORS), IV fluids and diarrhea kits [35]. UNICEF serves as
the WaSH cluster lead and reported having run several
cholera awareness campaigns including the deployment of
20,000 community hygiene promoters [35, 36].
On their webpage for Yemen, the International Rescue
Committee (IRC) described delivering health, nutrition,
WaSH services, essential drugs and medical supplies,
training health staff on cholera treatment and advocating
for a direct humanitarian air service and for peace [37].
In a Lancet appeal, IRC staff further described providing
seven hospitals with drugs, supplies and infrastructure,
deploying mobile health teams and establishing commu-
nity health volunteer networks for referral of malnour-
ished children to treatment and counsel [38].
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
reported having sent medical supplies including IV
fluids, ORS, antibiotics and chlorine tablets for cholera
management, supported 17 cholera treatment facilities
and provided care to nearly one in five cholera cases in
Yemen, and they had dispatched engineers to restore
water supply systems in the country [22, 39].
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) described having ad-
mitted more than 103,000 patients to 37 cholera treat-
ment centers and oral rehydration points [40] and
planning to conduct outreach activities including chlor-
ination of infected water sources, distribution of hygiene
kits and awareness-raising via radio stations and mos-
ques [41].
While the above is not an exhaustive list of all the ac-
tivities of these organizations, it should at least provide
an overview of some of their main focus areas in Yemen
up until the time of review. It is also important to note
that it was not within the scope of this paper to review
the activities of all major engineering and infrastructure
organizations present in Yemen, as well as the examined
health organizations, and the following discussion of
sanitation efforts will pertain only to organizations with
a health mandate. Furthermore, the humanitarian crisis
in Yemen has been neglected by the international com-
munity [23–25], and any criticism of the humanitarian
response presented in this paper should reflect back to
other stakeholders such as donors, politicians and other
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Table 1 Summary of some of the key activities of the major international humanitarian health organizations in Yemen as stated on
their official websites in December, 2017, and in the academic literature reviewed by May, 2018. This is not an exhaustive list, but
may serve as an indicator of some of the main focus areas of these individual organizations during the conflict up until the reviews
were conducted. (Some categories may overlap)
Key activities WHO [22, 31, 33, 34] UNICEF [35, 36] IRC [37, 38] ICRC [22, 39] MSF [40, 41]
Delivery of new
health services
Operated 406
general health and
nutrition mobile
teams
Delivered health and
nutrition services, essential
drugs and medical supplies
Established 37 cholera
treatment centers and oral
rehydration points
Delivered child and
nutrition interventions
in 323 districts
Deployed mobile health
teams
Established 36 cholera
treatment centers
Established community
health volunteer networks
for referral of malnourished
children to treatment and
counsel
Established 139 oral
rehydration corners
Support of
existing
health system
Sustained functionality
of 414 health facilities
See “Health infrastructure” Supported 17 cholera
treatment facilities
Health
infrastructure
Distributed more than
2 million liters of fuel
for hospital generators,
ambulances etc.
Delivered 40 tons of
medical equipment
including medicine,
ORS, IV fluids and
diarrhea kits.
Provided seven hospitals
with drugs, supplies and
infrastructure
Sent medical supplies
including IV fluids, ORS,
antibiotics and chlorine
tablets for cholera
management
Delivered 1 million
bags of IV fluids
Distributed 158
cholera kits
Sent 1450 cholera cots
Shipped in
ambulances
WaSH Provided safe water
to over one million
people
Delivered WaSH services Dispatched engineers to
restore water supply
systems in the country
Planned to conduct
outreach activities
including chlorination
of infected water sources
and distribution of
hygiene kits
Deployed 20,000
community hygiene
promoters (part of
awareness campaigns
below)
Staff training Trained 900 health
workers in cholera
management
Trained health staff on
cholera treatment
Epidemiological
activities
Expanded disease
surveillance capacity
Management Coordination of Health
Cluster Yemen
WaSH cluster lead
Awareness Ran several cholera
awareness campaigns
Planned to conduct
awareness-raising via radio
stations and mosques
Advocacy Advocated for a direct
humanitarian air service
and for peace
Summary output of
activities
Treated 700,000
suspected cases
of cholera
Provided care to nearly
one in five cholera
cases in Yemen
Admitted more than
103,000 patients
Abbreviations: WHO World Health Organization, UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund, IRC International Rescue Committee, ICRC International
Committee of the Red Cross, MSF Médecins Sans Frontières, WaSH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene, ORS Oral Rehydration Solution
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decision makers that have failed to allocate sufficient re-
sources to this crisis. In regards hereto, the IRC has
pointed to the fact that “only 47% of the UN’s 2016 re-
sponse plan was funded, leaving a shortfall of US$868 mil-
lion to cover the basic needs of 14 million people” [38],
while the WHO experienced a funding gap of more than
80% in late 2015 for their activities in the Yemen health
cluster [42, 43]. At the High-Level Pledging Event for the
Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen on April 25, 2017 in Gen-
eva, US$1.1 billion was raised, falling short US$1 billion
from the UN estimate of what would be needed “to prevent
a full-blown humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen” [22]. An
additional funding appeal at the event for $250 million
specifically for combatting cholera yielded only $47 million
[22]. This was eventually followed up by a US$2 billion
funding pledge at a new High-Level Pledging Event in
April, 2018, with financial contributions among others
coming from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and
Kuwait, which are member countries of the Saudi-led co-
alition, and the United States, the United Kingdom and
France, which are supporting countries [44–50].
Oral cholera vaccines
A striking observation from our review of the humanitar-
ian response is the absence of delivering OCVs in any of
the examined organizations’ attempts to control the out-
break, except for the WHO, Health and WaSH clusters’
description of plans to explore the feasibility of OCVs. At
the time (December, 2017), nearly 1 million cases had
already occurred [51]. In July 2017, 3 months into the out-
break, 500,000 OCVs had been scheduled to arrive in
Sana’a, but they were redirected because the request was
cancelled by the requestor [52]. A concern raised by some
aid agencies was that a mass immunization would be lo-
gistically difficult and that the impact of vaccination would
be minimal due to the scale of the outbreak [53]. In a Lan-
cet Gastroenterology & Hepatology editorial it is stated that
“… plans for a vaccination effort were deemed futile and
scrapped, citing security issues, challenges in distribution
and administration, and the sheer scale of the epidemic...”
[22]. In August 2018, nearly 16months into the outbreak,
OCVs were finally delivered to 540,000 people by the
WHO and UNICEF, and a follow-up round was con-
ducted in September reaching about 387,000 of these
people [54, 55].
OCVs for emergency settings are stored in a donor-
funded stockpile managed by the International Coordinat-
ing Group on Vaccine Provision (ICG) [5]. A recent meta-
analysis of seven randomized trials and six observational
studies estimates the mean effectiveness of standard two-
dose killed oral cholera vaccination at 76% and mean effi-
cacy at 58%, with protection lasting for at least 3 years
[56]. Oral cholera vaccination has been demonstrated to
be safe, logistically feasible and acceptable by the recipient
population [56–60], as well as inexpensive in various set-
tings, with total costs including procurement and delivery
per fully vaccinated individual of less than US$10 [61–65].
Accepting the unacceptable premise that the Yemeni
conflict became reality, the question that arises is: Could
the largest cholera outbreak ever recorded have been
avoided or at least managed, had enough OCVs been de-
ployed earlier on in the conflict?
The solely theoretically based answer to this question
is: Most likely, given the available evidence of the qual-
ities of OCVs. However, considering the nature of this
humanitarian emergency, this answer becomes little
more than an ex post facto rationalization of a deeply
chaotic situation that, as indicated above, most probably
did not lend itself to orderly and comprehensive public
health interventions such as mass vaccination.
Human Rights Watch have reported utterly chaotic
conditions in Yemen [66]. If their reports are anywhere
close to the truth, then that would provide an explan-
ation of why mass OCV campaigns may simply not have
been possible earlier on in the conflict, as indicated by
the Lancet Gastroenterology & Hepatology editorial men-
tioned earlier [22]. Also, given the fact that more than
two million Yemenis are internally displaced within their
country [67], and that many likely are internally trapped,
mass public health interventions are nowhere as easily
carried out as in a refugee camp setting in a country not
immersed in conflict.
However, this explanation is challenged by the magni-
tude of the other humanitarian operations that it evidently
has been possible to carry out in Yemen. In light hereof,
some level of criticism may be warranted of the inter-
national humanitarian response as being very adept at
managing cases when the outbreak had begun, as reflected
by the impressively low case fatality rate of 0.21%, but
ill-equipped in terms of preventing a cholera outbreak in
the approximately 2 years of conflict and humanitarian
presence that preceded the outbreak (this view is shared
by Dr. Anita Zaidi in a recent opinion piece in Nature
[68]), or controlling it once it had occurred.
Moving forward
Concerning water and hygiene interventions, it appears
that the Health and WaSH clusters, the IRC, MSF and
ICRC have been thoroughly engaged. However, we were
unable to document any major dedicated sanitation inter-
ventions carried out by the international humanitarian
health organizations investigated. As mentioned, this may
likely be due to the type of organizations examined, but
nevertheless it leads to the question of whether and to
what extent international humanitarian health organiza-
tions should increase their focus on addressing the envir-
onmental determinants of health rather than managing
the cases they generate. This is a core discussion in
Federspiel and Ali BMC Public Health         (2018) 18:1338 Page 4 of 8
humanitarian health that it is not within our mandate nor
our abilities to answer, but the case of Yemen underlines
the necessity of having this discussion on a continuous
basis within each implementing humanitarian health
organization. Going forward, given the current breakdown
of sanitation systems [15] and the key importance of sani-
tation for prevention of a cholera outbreak in areas where
the population has not been exposed and has no immun-
ity to cholera, as well as for prevention of other water-
borne disease outbreaks, sanitation has to be a key priority
in the ongoing humanitarian response and the future de-
velopment work when the conflict settles.
OCVs were not delivered until nearly 3.5 years into
this humanitarian emergency, which has most likely
been due to ongoing conflict, logistical circumstances,
the scale of the epidemic, impairment of the humanitar-
ian response by the parts to the conflict and some de-
gree of negligence from donors, politicians and other
decision makers. Whatever the reasons, OCVs were not
distributed until nearly 16 months into the cholera out-
break by which time more than a million cases had ac-
cumulated. Neither were they in the two years of WaSH
infrastructure breakdown that preceded the outbreak.
This should serve as a historic example of the failure to
control the spread of cholera given the tools that are
available. Today, “cholera outbreaks are entirely contain-
able” (The Lancet editorial, 2017) [6].
Based on their experience with the cholera outbreak in
Juba, South Sudan, Parker et al. (2017) advocate among
other things for improved laboratory and surveillance cap-
acity in countries to be able to declare outbreaks faster, and
for simplification of the mechanisms to access the ICG
stockpile to allow for timely deployment of vaccines [69].
Single-dose killed oral cholera vaccination has been
attempted, and the strategy has shown a mean short-
term effectiveness of 69% in meta-analysis based on two
studies [56], and 40% efficacy based on one trial [70].
This could serve as a potential option for when logistical
and security constraints render the standard regimen
impossible [56, 60, 69–71]. The strategy however re-
mains contended [72, 73] and needs further evaluation.
Live-attenuated OCVs have been developed and shown
promising results for single-dose administration [74],
however their cost is likely going to be a significant bar-
rier to their use in mass vaccination campaigns.
The 2011 Sphere Handbook applicable in the Yemen
conflict did not specifically recommend reactive or pre-
emptive mass OCVs [75], but it was also written before
the advent of the ICG OCV stockpile. The available draft
of the upcoming 2018 version includes this, and we
warmly welcome this progress [76]. The ICG stockpile has
now expanded from 2 million doses entering the stockpile
per year in 2013 to over 25 million doses expected annu-
ally from 2018 and onwards [77]. This scale-up will be a
crucial improvement of the ability to control cholera in
emergency settings, and sustained funding to maintain
this stockpile will be essential for controlling future
outbreaks.
Assessment of the need for mass OCVs should happen
pre-emptively in a humanitarian emergency. Regarding
this issue, Qadri et al. (2017) and Parker et al. (2017)
argue for the development of validated predictive tools
to help guide the decision on when and to which hu-
manitarian emergencies OCVs should be deployed, a no-
tion we do support, whilst acknowledging the difficulty
of the task of predicting the outbreak of cholera [53, 69].
The current WHO framework for decision-making on
vaccination in acute humanitarian emergencies offers a
tool for assessing the risk level for a cholera outbreak,
and in the case of Yemen, the high-risk criteria were ful-
filled [78]. The current WHO position paper on cholera
vaccines offers general advice in four sentences on which
factors to consider regarding the use of OCVs for chol-
era control in humanitarian emergencies [79], while the
available draft of the 2018 Sphere Handbook offers fur-
ther general advice on this [76]. In the end, the decision
has to be made on a case-by-case basis by the people in-
volved in a given humanitarian response, leaving room
for a degree of arbitrary in the decision-making process
that should at least be sought to be minimized through
the development of more specific, comprehensive and
actionable frameworks based on the accumulating and
promising evidence from mass OCV campaigns in hu-
manitarian emergencies [26, 29, 60, 71, 80–84].
Based on the example of Yemen, Dureab et al. (2017)
argue for the institution of emergency preparedness sys-
tems by countries in conflict capable of preventing epi-
demics [21]. While we do applaud this thought as viewed
in isolation, we see considerable political, institutional and
logistical barriers to such systems during active conflict,
and believe that part of this mandate therefore necessarily
has to remain in the hands of international impartial insti-
tutions such as the UN organizations.
Finally, in terms of advocacy, The Lancet editorial
board notes that high-level attention for Yemen is neces-
sary with continued advocacy including at the UN level
for the protection of health in conflict situations [25].
We will add that public health professionals and -aca-
demics are in a strong position to join in by applying
their knowledge and skills in advocacy efforts for peace
and the preservation of public health in conflict and to
keep the world’s leaders accountable for the health and
human rights consequences of their actions.
Conclusions
The conflict in Yemen has caused the largest cholera
outbreak in epidemiologically recorded history. OCVs
were not delivered pre-emptively, nor until nearly 16
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months into the outbreak, during which time more than
a million cases occurred. We are, hopefully, entering into
a new era in which OCVs will be amply available for rapid
disbursement to humanitarian emergencies. Continuous
funding to the ICG OCV stockpile will be crucial to main-
tain this option for prevention and control of cholera out-
breaks. Of equal importance will be the timely recognition
of the need for mass OCV deployment and development
of more specific, comprehensive and actionable evidence-
based frameworks to help guide this decision, however
difficult this may be. The Yemen cholera outbreak high-
lights the importance for international humanitarian
health organizations to have a continuous discussion
about whether and to what extent they should increase
their focus on pre-emptively addressing the environ-
mental determinants of communicable diseases in hu-
manitarian emergencies. Finally, strong advocacy from
the public health community for peace and the protec-
tion of human health, by bringing to attention the pub-
lic health impacts of armed conflict and keeping the
world’s political leaders accountable to their actions,
will remain crucial.
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